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ABSTRACT 
The object of this research paper is to discuss what is meant by the concept of 
"indirect discrimination" in employment, now that section 65 of the Human Rights 
Act 1993 has made provision for this to be recognised as unlawful. In particular , I 
examine how section 65 of the Act might be interpreted and applied by both the 
Human Rights Commission and the Complaints Review Tribunal in New Zealand. 
I argue that despite the enactment of section 65 being a significant step forward in 
terms of recognition of discrimination, its potential is limited. This is because anti-
discrimination legislation is premised upon the principle of formal equality which 
requires a comparison between persons, usually men and women. The section is also 
limited in its application. First, the specific nature of the wording used in the section 
means it fails to address the structural nature of discrimination in the workforce. 
Secondly, there are evidentiary difficulties in proving a case because such cases are 
reliant on circumstantial evidence. 
The paper concludes that the present Act must be amended to reflect equality of 
outcome if the best opportunities are to be guaranteed for all, particularly in the 
context of employment. 
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The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,800 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades there has been a growing recognition in many jurisdictions I of the 
need to broaden the meaning of discrimination to encompass "indirect 
discrimination". 2 This type of discrimination is, for the most part, a result of 
unconscious practices or policies, that although neutral on their face, have 
discriminatory effects on some minorities. New Zealand legislation has made 
provision for indirect discrimination to be recognised as unlawful. It is hoped this 
will help bring about a change in the attitudes of society and eliminate the effects of 
such practices in the employment context. 
If anti-discrimination legislation is to be effective in the area of employment, there 
must be a challenge to the generally profound apathy and/or negative attitudes 
amongst employers as to what comprises discrimination, particularly in respect of the 
concept of indirect discrimination. Cotterrell 3 identifies two common attitudes to 
anti-discrimination law. First, such law is unnecessary because there are already 
equal opportunities in the workplace. Secondly, where discrimination is occurring, 
the law does not motivate some employers to act any differently. 
These attitudes reflect why equal opportunity employment policies and programmes 
have been afforded such a low priority. According to the Equal Opportunities 
Commission (United Kingdom), this is partly due to tough economic times and partly 
because employers view this type of legislation as excessive and an unnecessary 
regulatory burden.4 
Section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993, 5 provides specific provision for indirect 
discrimination namely, unlawful discrimination arising from conduct, practices, 
2 
3 
4 
5 
United States of America, Canada, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. 
Indirect discrimination involves practices that are fair in form, discriminatory in impact and 
cannot be justified. 
Roger Cotterrell "The Impact of Sex Discrimination Legislation" (1981) Public Law 469, 4 72-
473. 
Brian Chiplin and Peter J Sloane Tackling Discrimination at the Workplace An Analysis of Sex 
Discrimination in Britain (Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1982) 34. 
The Human Rights Act 1993, which came into force on I February 1994. 
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conditions or requirements which, although on their face appear neutral , put 
prohibited groups 6 including women, at a disadvantage. 
It provides: 
Where any conduct, practice, requirement, or condition that is not apparently in contravention 
of any provision of this Part of this Act has the effect of treating a person or group of persons 
differently on one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in a situation where such 
treatment would be unlawful under any provision of this Part of this Act other than this section, 
that conduct, practice, condition, or requirement shall be unlawful under that provision unless 
the person whose conduct or practice is in issue, or who imposes the condition or requirement, 
establishes good reason for it. 
This research paper argues that although the enactment of section 65 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993 is a significant step towards ensuring equal opportunity, particularly 
in the context of employment, it does not go far enough. The potential of section 65 
of the Act is restricted by the general limitation of anti-discrimination law, because 
that law is premised upon the principle of formal equality, which in cases of sex 
discrimination requires a comparison with a man or group of men. In addition, 
application of the section is specifically limited to conduct, practices, requirements or 
conditions, such as selection criteria for recruitment or promotion, rather than 
addressing the wider structural discrimination inherent m large corporate 
organisations. The effectiveness of section 65 of the Act is further limited by 
evidentiary difficulties of proof in that cases of indirect discrimination are entirely 
reliant on circumstantial evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from that. 
6 Section 21 of the Human Rights Act I 993 , provides certain prohibited grounds of 
discrimination and includes previous existing grounds, namely: sex, marital status, religious or 
ethical belief, race, colour, ethnic and national origins and age (in the area of employment). 
New grounds include: disability, age in all other areas covered by the Act, political opinion, 
employment status, family status and sexual orientation. Each of these grounds of 
discrimination applies to the following areas: employment, education, access to public places, 
provision of goods and services and housing and accommodation. There are numerous general 
and specific exceptions relating to the grounds in each area. Those concerning employment in 
particular are found in sections 24-35. 
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Part II of the paper will first consider the general limitation of anti-discrimination 
law. This is relevant in understanding why section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993 
will not be effective in bringing about the structural change required in the workplace. 
In particular, I will argue that anti-discrimination law of this type fails to challenge 
the existing structure of the workplace and merely removes the structural 
impediments to equal employment opportunities. This is largely due to the principle 
of formal equality, upon which such legislation is premised, which requires a 
comparison between persons. This disadvantages women particularly, in that it 
assumes identical treatment and recognition of unequal effects will result in the same 
opportunities for all. Despite these limitations complainants in New Zealand are 
fortunate in being able to access the law with relative ease. Section 65 of the Act not 
only provides them with an alternative avenue for redress but also sends a message to 
society that discrimination is something more than simply overt prejudice. 
Part III of the paper will look at the concept of discrimination including the meaning 
of the word discrimination and the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination together with the characteristics of the latter which might be caught 
under section 65 of the Act. 
Part IV will canvass the purposive approach taken to anti-discrimination legislation 
particularly by the fom1er Equal Opportunities Tribunal in New Zealand and also in 
Canada. It is submitted that this approach will influence both the Human Rights 
Commission and the Complaints Review Tribunal's interpretation of specific wording 
in section 65 of the Act. Accordingly, Part V assesses how specific wording such as 
"condition", "requirement", or "practice" has been interpreted in overseas provisions 
including what particular arguments in defence have been put forward by 
respondents. Some of these arguments may well be utilised in New Zealand in 
establishing "good reason" in terms of section 65 of the Act. 
Part VI considers the evidentiary difficulties. These include the difficulty in 
establishing a prima facie case especially where a case of discrimination is dependent 
upon circumstantial evidence. I will therefore evaluate the method adopted in the 
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United States to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, because this method 
provides useful guidance in demonstrating how a case might be established by the 
Commission or before the Tribunal in New Zealand. 
Part VII discusses the burden of proof and the type of evidence which may be 
presented in support of a case of indirect discrimination. Both issues highlight the 
problems encountered by complainants in obtaining a successful outcome. In 
particular, there are difficulties in terms of identification of others similarly affected, 
reliance on statistical evidence, choice of the relevant labour pool for comparison and 
subsequent interpretation of the evidence by the Tribunal. 
Part VIII then presents a case synopsis to illustrate how section 65 of the Act might 
be applied to a fact situation, taking into account the method used in the United States 
to establish a prima facie case of indirect discrimination and the evidence required for 
the Commission or Tribunal to prove such a case. 
I conclude, in Part IX, that the Human Rights Act 1993 must be amended to reflect 
"equality of outcome" if elimination of discrimination is to be achieved and the 
structural nature of the workplace challenged and changed. While successful 
individual cases may alter some employer's attitudes, the ripple effect will be slow 
moving in both changing present attitudes and eliminating discrimination. It is 
submitted that a proactive rather than a reactive approach by the law is needed. The 
initial step must be to amend the Human Rights Act 1993 to make provision for the 
Tribunal to grant remedial orders to compel employers to implement equal 
opportunity programmes where discrimination is held to have occurred. Thereafter, 
the law should provide for mandatory monitoring of the workplace so that not only 
the san1e but the best opportunities are guaranteed for all. This will require a 
recognition of both the public and private spheres of women's lives in order to 
achieve the necessary structural change in the workplace and hopefully, also in our 
gendered society. 
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II ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
A Structural Discrimination 
In order to discuss section 65 of the Act in terms of its limitations in tackling 
structural discrimination it is necessary to establish what is commonly meant by 
structural discrimination, a problem long recognised in the United States. 
Structural discrimination, often referred to as institutional discrimination, 1s an 
insidious type of discrimination described as follows: 7 
[B]ehaviour [which) has become so well institutionalized that the individual generally does not 
have to exercise choices to operate in a [sexist] manner. The rules and procedures of the large 
organization have already prestructured the choice. The individual only has to conform to the 
operating norms of the organization and the institution will do the discriminating for [her]. 
The first important case in the United States in this area was that of Griggs v Duke 
Power Company 8, a case in which certain workers were excluded from jobs 
disproportionately because of the employer's selection requirements of aptitude tests 
and a high school diploma. In effect, those requirements had a highly adverse impact 
on particular racial groups. 9 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the plaintiffs 
claim of unlawful discrimination on the basis that the aptitude tests and diploma were 
not requirements related to job performance, stating: 10 
7 
8 
9 
10 
What is required .. . is the removal of artificial , arbitrary, unnecessary barriers to employment 
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other 
impermissible classification . 
Christopher McCrudden " Institutional Discrimination" (1982) 2 Oxford J Legal Stud 303 , 306 
in which McCrudden was referring to " institutional racism" as defined by Knowles and Previt 
in 1969. It is submitted there seems to be no reason why this would not apply equally to 
" institutional sexism". The distinction made by McCrudden is that structural or institutional 
discrimination is additional to " prejudicial discrimination" (overt discrimination in New 
Zealand) and is one reason for exclusion from employment. 
401 US424(l97I). 
Above n7, 329-335 for a detailed discussion of the case and the use of such exclusionary tests . 
Above n7, 335. 
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This case was the precedent used subsequently by Britain in broadening its concept of 
discrimination, namely: the prohibition of indirect discrimination in both the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976. The new meaning given to 
discrimination, unlike the direct ( overt) type of discrimination, is premised on a 
principle of fair equality of opportunity. 11 
A demand for fair equality of opportunity is more often than not based on a recognition of the 
structural sources of unequal opportunity and in particular on an acceptance of what has 
become known as "institutional discrimination". 
Despite the recognition of the problems inherent in structural discrimination it 
appears that indirect discrimination provisions have not had the intended desired 
effect in altering the status quo. This has been attributed to the fundamental 
limitation of the principle upon which discrimination legislation is based, namely, 
formal equality, which requires a comparison of persons usually men and women. It 
is to this principle that the paper now turns. 
B Principle of Formal Equality 
Following the broadening of the meaning of the concept of discrimination and the 
optimism it may have initially generated, there remains a general scepticism 
concerning the results gained through its inclusion in anti-discrimination law. This is, 
it seems, largely due to both the adoption of the concept of formal equality as a 
principle in attempting to eliminate discrimination, particularly in cases of sex 
discrimination, and also to the evidential difficulties 
discrimination. 
. . 
m provmg indirect 
II Above n7, 345. In particular, McCrudden's view that the new principle differs from the simple 
non-discrimination principle in that it allows account to be taken of the effect an employer's 
actions might have on a particular group. It requires that the employer positively offset the 
disadvantages of a practice in ensuring the employer does certain things together with 
refraining from prohibited actions. However, the new concept is used differently in different 
countries. In the United States its function is largely remedial while in Britain, it is largely 
preventative. 
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In particular, the very nature of anti-discrimination legislation is based on a 
comparison between persons, frequently men and women, "who are assumed to be 
otherwise similarly situated". 12 In effect, the fundamental principle underlying such 
legislation is based on a premise of identical treatment for example, with the sexes, as 
to whether or not men and women have been treated differently in materially the same 
situation. 
Dowd asks the following question: 13 
To what extent can [indirect discrimination] analysis contribute to the resolution of the gender 
paradox? ... [For indirect discrimination] ... rests upon demonstrating the comparative 
disadvantage of one sex to the other. It does not comprehend mutual disadvantage. 
She believes the concept of equality used in discrimination analysis does not 
challenge the existing structures and simply "accepts the basic workplace structure, ... 
rather than asserting a new structure of rights or a new structure not based on 
rights". 14 
Ellis also argues that, in practice, the necessity for a male comparator "represents a 
very serious limitation on the usefulness of [anti-discrimination law] on account of 
the prevalence of occupational segregation of the sexes" 15 and "equality of 
opportunity cannot be attained unless it is recognised that society does not allow all 
its members to compete from an identical base". 16 She states that legal recognition of 
the concept of indirect discrimination does go some way to acknowledging the 
differences of experience between men and women which if absent, would mean that 
the legislation achieved little more than reinforcing existing differentials. 17 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan The Hidden Gender of law (The Federation Press, NSW, 
1990) 87. 
Nancy E Dowd "Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination 
Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace" (1989) 24 Harv Civ Rights - Civ Lib L Rev 79, 137-
138. 
Above n 13, 140. 
Evelyn Ellis Sex Discrimination law (Gower Publishing Co Ltd, England, 1988) 37. 
Above n 15, 81. 
Above n 15, 81. 
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This does not overcome the problems inherent with comparison, and in particular, the 
subsequent interpretation of the legislation when dealing with a highly subjective area 
where perceptions of women and men are likely to be viewed very differently. 18 
Differential treatment and unequal effects may be interpreted by some individual 
Complaints Review Tribunal members as natural occurrences attributable to 
biological differences and real choices. Analysis of both the facts and the legislation 
may therefore often simply reflect a reconstruction of a male standard which is 
objectified as both neutral and universal. 
Such an analysis perpetuates the gendered division of work/family roles and 
stereotypes. The roles inherent in the notion of comparison will be evaluated further 
in the context of proof later in the paper. Suffice it to say, that in any case of 
discrimination the complainant must illustrate a parallel situation where another 
(male) person was treated in a different manner and where this is not possible, will 
need to rely on a hypothetical comparison and the inferences that can be drawn from 
that. 
The wider issue for consideration at this stage is whether the ideal of formal equality, 
particularly in employment, really achieves any change in minorities' and in 
particular, women's disadvantaged position. Certainly, where equality only means 
adapting to the male norm then its limitations are obvious. 
It is suggested by O'Donovan and Szyszczak that: 19 
18 
19 
As presently constructed, anti-discrimination legislation does not challenge institutions, 
language, structures, that have so long excluded women. It merely asks that men move over to 
make a little room for the women who can conform to the male norm . To conform women 
must become token women, surrogate men, whose role is to confirm liberalism without 
challenging or changing the status quo . 
Nicola Lacey " Legislation Against Sex Discrimination : Questions from a Feminist Perspective" 
(1987) Law and Soc J 411 , 415 . 
Above n 12, IOI which quotes Katherine O ' Donovan and Erika Szyszczak ' s in Equality and 
Sex Discrimination Law (Basil Blackwell , Oxford, 1988) 44-45 . 
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In reality, anti-discrimination law by conceptualising the problem as sex 
discrimination, as opposed to discrimination against women, obscures the real 
problem because it simply confines its goal to ensuring that sex does not play a part in 
either the allocation of certain goods in specific areas or in equality of opportunity in 
the public sphere. 20 In other words, the law fails to recognise that women's role in 
the private sphere both influences and determines her opportunities in the market. 
Eliminating differential treatment in the workplace does not alter the status quo and 
the general oppression of women as a group because the focus is towards biological 
sex rather than the inextricably intertwined gender roles of her private life. 21 
It obscures for women the actual causes of their oppression and treats discrimination against 
women as an irrational and capricious departure from the normal objective operation of the 
market, instead of recognizing such discrimination as a pervasive aspect of our dichotomized 
system. 
Katherine O'Donovan believes the goal of equal opportunity for both sexes in the 
market place is a minimal one in that to ensure women get an equal start with their 
male counterparts would mean that the legislation take into account private domestic 
roles. 22 She states that "[ s Jo long as equality remains a formal notion, ... structural 
obstacles will prevent those for whom opportunities are opened from taking 
advantage of them". 23 Procedural equality as recognised in indirect discrimination, 
therefore, goes some way to acknowledging the private sphere of women's lives. 24 
It is submitted that the recognition of the concept of indirect discrimination in anti-
discrimination law is a significant step in the right direction. It identifies sex 
discrimination as a social problem rather than merely an individual one and accepts 
the matter complained of in the context of patterns of relative treatment of men and 
women generally. The focus is on the consequential effects measured as relative 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Above nl8, 415-416. 
Above n 12, IOI where the authors quote Frances Olsen (an American lawyer) "The Family and 
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" ( 1983) 96 Harv L Rev 1497, 1552. 
Katherine O'Donovan Sexual Divisions in law (George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, London, 
1985) 167. 
Above n22, 167. 
Above n22, 179. 
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effects on men and women in the relevant area affected by it. 25 This of itself gives 
rise to further problems in proving such cases which will be discussed later in the 
paper. 
However, more importantly, it allows individuals an alternative avenue of redress 
under the law which in New Zealand does not appear to be hindered by administrative 
difficulties in terms of accessing the law. 
C Access to the Law 
It is important not to be disillusioned by the general limitations of section 65 of the 
Human Rights Act 1993. 26 Clearly it will inevitably take both an awareness and time 
to transform society's attitudes and practices in order to eradicate indirect 
discrimination. 
Many of the alleged general difficulties in discrimination cases experienced by 
complainants in accessing the law in Britain have largely been overcome in New 
Zealand, 27 namely: under-resourcing of the Equal Opportunities Commission; 
inadequate powers to fulfil its statutory responsibilities; vulnerability to legal 
challenge in exercising its investigatory powers; correlation between legal 
representation and plaintiff success; Industrial Tribunal's incompetency in the face of 
complex and unfamiliar legal provisions; and grievously inadequate remedies. 
It would appear that resources are generally adequate in New Zealand in terms of the 
funding of the Human Rights Commission ("the Commission") to carry out its 
statutory responsibilities. This undoubtedly contributes to its effectiveness within the 
areas it operates. In addition, the Complaints Division is given wide powers to hear 
or obtain information from such persons as it thinks fit. 28 There is no cost to the 
complainant. Where the Commission has formed an opinion that there is substance to 
the complaint, and a settlement is not able to be effected, the Proceedings 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Above n3, 475. 
Above n5; see in particular Part I p2 which sets out section 65 of the Act. 
Above n18, 412. 
Above n5, section 78(3). 
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Commissioner can bring proceedings before the Complaints Review Tribunal ("the 
Tribunal"). 29 Moreover, the remedies that are available include: a declaration that the 
defendant has breached the Act; an order restraining the defendant from continuing or 
repeating the breach; damages of up to $200,000.00 which are the same as may be 
awarded by the District Court and an order to redress any loss or damages suffered by 
the complainant. The Tribunal may also declare any contract illegal and provide 
relief for that. Lastly, it may order such relief as it thinks fit. 30 
The latter remedy 31 has, until recently, been used by the Tribunal in the past to 
require defendants to put in place equal opportunity programmes but this may now be 
in question following the recent case of New Zealand Van Lines Limited v 
Proceedings Commissioner 32 in which Smellie J, overturned the Tribunal's order 
directing the employer to implement an anti-discrimination programme stating it was 
without jurisdiction in terms of "other relief as the Tribunal thinks fit". 
This is unfortunate in that the effectiveness of a provision such as section 65 of the 
Human Rights Act 1993 will now also be limited in terms of its remedial effect. 
Although it will still ensure individual complainants are compensated, where indirect 
discrimination is proven, such cases will do little to assist the structural oppression of 
women. The value of such a provision is already presently undermined by the private 
and confidential nature of the Commission's investigation process. This prevents 
publication of the names of respondents in those cases where the Commission is of 
the opinion that either direct or indirect discrimination has occurred and the matter 
has been settled between the parties. 
It remains to be seen whether New Zealand cases will have similar difficulties in 
proving indirect discrimination, as has happened overseas, but it seems likely that 
overseas jurisprudence will be relied upon to support a Commission opinion or 
Tribunal finding that indirect discrimination can be established on the facts. The 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Above n5, section 83. 
Above n5, section 86. 
Above n5, section 86(2)(g). 
(1994) 17 TCL 3/1; Unreported, 3 August 1994, High Court, Rotorua Registry, AP83/93. 
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reason for this is that indirect discrimination is entirely reliant on circumstantial 
evidence. As most cases before the Commission are settled without ever reaching the 
Tribunal, there is little precedent in New Zealand to refer to. Accordingly, the paper 
will consider overseas jurisprudence to illustrate how section 65 of the Human Rights 
Act 1993 might be interpreted. 
Before considering specific overseas provisions it is important to understand the 
concept of discrimination and particularly, the difference between direct and indirect 
discrimination. This is necessary because of the differing evidential issues such as 
the establishment of a prima facie case and burden of proof discussed in Parts VI and 
VII of the paper. 
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III CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION 
A The Meaning of Discrimination 
In looking at what is meant by the word discrimination in section 65 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993, it should be noted that the section refers to prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. Although the word "discrimination" is not defined in the Human 
Rights Act 1993, section 2 does provide that "prohibited ground of discrimination" 
has the meaning given to it by section 21 of the Act. 33 Accordingly, it is useful to 
also refer to the word "discrimination" as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary 
which states: 34 
... a difference between or between, distinguish from another; make a distinction, esp[ ecially] 
unjustly on grounds of race or colour or sex, ... against, select for unfavourable treatment ... 
It is evident from this definition why the word "discrimination" was able to be 
broadened to include the new concept of indirect discrimination. As Ellis 35 suggests, 
the definition itself connotes two meanings in ordinary usage. The first is that of 
differentiating between two people and the second, is to make an adverse distinction. 
As very few sex discrimination cases have reached the Equal Opportunities Tribunal 
in New Zealand it is therefore only in overseas case law that the word 
"discrimination" has been analysed in terms of the law. In Tomen v Ontario Teachers 
Federation 36 the Court held that the determination of whether there was 
discrimination involved a question of law and in doing so accepted the reasoning of 
an earlier Canadian case which stated: 37 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
The word discrimination ... is a word of some complexity and can have a number of meanings 
depending on the context in which it is used. In the field of human rights legislation, the term 
Above n6. 
(7 ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982). 
Above n 15, 75. 
( 1990) 11 CHRR 0/223 Ont. 
Above n36, para 76. 
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embraces a concept which is not necessarily the same as in other fields of endeavour. The 
meaning of the word "discrimination" or the phrase "to be discriminated against" in the context 
of this statute is not a word or a phrase which is capable of reduction to further simplicity. It is 
a word or a phrase which requires interpretation and in my opinion it is a question of law. 
Section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993 specifically requires treatment which has 
the effect of treating people differently in a situation which would be unlawful 
elsewhere in the Act. It is therefore appropriate to describe what is meant by direct 
and indirect discrimination, as the latter is reliant on an understanding of the former. 
B Distinction Between Direct and Indirect Discrimination 
Direct discrimination usually involves either overt action or treatment "which in the 
case of a woman is less favourable than that which is or may be accorded to a 
man". 38 This requires, as already mentioned above, a comparison with a real or 
hypothetical person which illustrates that a person of a different sex, race or marital 
status 39 was treated in a different manner to the complainant. 
Indirect discrimination on the other hand involves a requirement or condition, and in 
New Zealand also includes a policy or conduct, which has the effect of treating a 
person or group of persons differently although on the face of it appears neutral. In 
operation, this results in discrimination against one particular person or group of 
persons on a prohibited ground prescribed in the legislation. 
Katherine O'Donovan argues 40 that indirect discrimination is concerned with 
procedures rather than outcomes or results and as such is an advance on the previous 
concept because it signifies a new approach to equality. 41 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Above n22, 171. 
Above n6. 
Above n22, 179-180. 
Above n22, 178 where O'Donovan quotes Christopher McCrudden's ideas and explanation of 
the concept of indirect discrimination. 
-15-
The principle on which [it] is based differs from the simple non-discrimination principle (which 
underlines the idea of direct discrimination) in being positive as well as negative in its 
requirements and in taking into account some of the prior existing disadvantages which black 
and women workers bring to the marketplace .... Also unlike the simple non-discrimination 
principle, it requires questions to be asked not only about the precise basis on which the good 
being distributed is deserved but also about the nature of the good being distributed. 
This idea has been endorsed in the term "employment equality" discussed in the 
Canadian case of O'Connell v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 42 which cited 
the Report of the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment (1984) where it was 
stated: 43 
Equality in employment means that no one is denied opportunities for reasons that have nothing 
to do with inherent ability. It means equal access free from arbitrary obstructives .... Equality 
in employment is not a concept that produces the same results for everyone. It is a concept that 
seeks to identify and remove, barrier by barrier, discriminatory disadvantages. Equality in 
employment is access to the fullest opportunity to exercise individual potential. 
In that case the Tribunal held that the concept of employment equality did not simply 
mean refraining from policies or practices involving positive discriminatory conduct. 
It also extended to omissions whereby there was a failure to create the conditions in 
which employment equality was possible. In other words, traditional sentiment was 
not to get in the way of job opportunity for women. 44 
This means an employer has a real obligation to ensure the work environment 
accommodates the aspirations of women seriously so they can share equally in the 
full range of employment opportunities available to men. 45 In practice, it indicates 
that a wider perspective of discrimination is adopted which removes the focus from 
individual comparison to that of "looking at the 'posture and condition' of women as 
a group compared to men as a group". 46 In doing so it permits scrutiny of women's 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
(1988) 9 CHRR D/5196. 
Above n42, para 39508. 
Above n42, para 39509. 
Above n42, para 39509. 
Above n22, 172. 
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general characteristics as a group which prevents them complying with what appear to 
be neutral requirements or practices, together with scrutiny of social stereotyping in 
those circumstances. 47 
However, recognising indirect discrimination will not address the structural nature of 
discrimination. It will merely assist in eliminating structural barriers rather than 
bringing about structural change. According to Dowd, indirect discrimination: 48 
... basically accepts the existing structure as a given, and accomplishes the goal of equal 
opportunity by minor tinkering and adjustment, removing unnecessary pieces of the structure if 
they have a disproportionate discriminatory effect. It can, at best, eliminate unjustified barriers; 
it cannot mandate a fundamental change in the structure. 
Having identified what is meant by direct and indirect discrimination it is helpful now 
to consider what features and characteristics are common to indirect discrimination. 
C Characteristics of Indirect Discrimination 
Recognition of indirect discrimination is certainly necessary where employment 
organisations which either consciously or unconsciously "reward 'sameness' and 
penalise 'difference' have an adverse impact on workers who have not traditionally 
been in a position to define organisational culture, and who are thus organisationally 
defined as 'different'." 49 
Hunter attributes the occurrence of indirect discrimination to the fact that 
organisations are saturated with male values derived from men's experience, as well 
as sexual and political values, and this "massively contributes to women's inequality 
in the workplace". 50 Inequality, she says, arises because men, especially male 
managers, tend to guard both their status and power and prefer to work with those 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Above n22, 172. 
Above nl3, 138-139. 
Rosemary Hunter indirect Discrimination in the Workplace (The Federation Press, Sydney, 
1992) 165. 
Above n49, 165 see quote which is referenced in footnote I. 
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sharing the same values and social qualities as themselves. As a result, they recruit 
and promote persons conforming to the organisational culture. 51 
It has been argued that indirect anti-discrimination provisions are not an appropriate 
vehicle from which to launch a wide ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a 
company's multiple employment practices simultaneously. Nor can just any 
employment practice be challenged simply because a disproportionate balance of 
prohibited groups exists in an employer's workforce. 52 
Accordingly, it is in the specific areas of recruitment and promotion that indirect 
discriminatory employment cases are most likely to arise. Overseas provisions 
appear to have been drafted more narrowly than in New Zealand so that they 
generally only apply to a specific condition, requirement or practice and do not 
include the word "conduct" which, it is submitted, widens what might constitute 
indirect discrimination within section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
In Canada, the Supreme Court defined a prima facie case in the context of indirect 
discrimination, as "one which covers the allegations made and which, if they are 
believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the complainant's favour in 
the absence of an answer from the respondent-employer". 53 It said such cases 
included specific recruitment practices instituted by employers such as aptitude and 
intelligence tests, educational requirements such as high school diplomas, height and 
weight requirements and practices where employers refused to employ persons with 
poor credit ratings. 
In addition, cases might also include selective placement of job advertisements and 
career information, word-of-mouth or informal recruitment procedures, all of which 
are a recognised means of perpetuating the organisation's cultural characteristics. 54 
Moreover, interview panels comprised entirely of men are likely to both apply and 
favour assessment criteria that represent male values and perspectives which may 
have an adverse effect on women's prospects in being hired or selected for the 
position when compared with men. 55 Similarly, valuing formal qualifications and/or 
experiences in paid employment for selection reasons may disadvantage those persons 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Above n49, 165. 
Pouncy v Prudential Insurance Co of America 668 F 2d 795 ( 1982). 
Ontario Human Rights Commission and O 'Malley v Simpsons-Sears Ltd ( 1985) 2 SCR 536, 
558. 
Above n49, 165-167. 
Above n49, 167- I 68. 
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who are unable to confirm to typical white male work patterns and as such have an 
adverse effect on women or racial minorities. 56 
Subsequent developments in the United States have now held indirect discrimination 
to include subjective, discretionary promotion systems. In Nord v United States Steel 
Corporation 57 the Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported the district 
court's finding that the employer had discriminated against a former employee on the 
basis of sex by failing to promote her to a sales representative position. It noted the 
district court's finding that the subjective nature of the defendant's promotion policy 
indicated a built-in mechanism for sex discrimination: 58 
... all of the management personnel were male; all of the supervisors were male and a principal 
factor in determining who received a promotion was the recommendation of a supervisor; there 
was no practice of posting job openings, rather, all information was conveyed by word of 
mouth; there was no established procedures or standards governing promotion; [and] 
employees were not provided with information regarding the necessary qualifications for 
promotion. 
The British courts have also recognised a promotion procedure is capable of being a 
"requirement or condition", for the purposes of section l(l)(b) of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975, in having a disproportionate impact on women. In Watches 
of Switzerland Limited v Savell, 59 despite the employer having a vague and 
subjective promotion procedure, namely that available positions were not advertised, 
persons considered for promotion were not interviewed and there were no written 
criteria for promotion, the Appeal Court reversed the Tribunal finding that this had 
had an adverse impact on women. In particular, the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 
doing so said that to establish a requirement or condition and disproportionate impact 
on women, Savell had to show that she could not achieve promotion because of the 
procedure for selection. As there was no evidence before the tribunal to justify that 
she could not achieve promotion by the employer's procedure, and she had been 
considered for promotion in 1981, there was nothing to indicate that she would fail to 
achieve promotion later because of her sex. 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Above n49, 170. 
758 F 2d 1462 (1985) . 
Above n57, 1466-1467. 
Above n49, 172; [1983] IRLR 141 (EAT). 
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In assessing the value and influence section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993 might 
have in removing structural barriers to equality of opportunity in the New Zealand 
workplace, the paper will first examine the use made of the now repealed section 27 
of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977, together with the general approach taken 
to anti-discrimination legislation in New Zealand. 
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IV NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
A Purposive Interpretation 
The Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and the Human Rights Act 1993, both set 
out to promote the advancement and provide better protection of human rights in New 
Zealand in general accordance with United Nations International Covenants on 
Human Rights. The aim of both was to prevent discrimination in certain areas on 
specific grounds rather than to punish the wrongdoer. 
In interpreting how such legislation should be approached, the former Equal 
Opportunities Tribunal, chaired by the then Mr R Smellie QC, adopted the purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation in H v E, 60 stating: 
Our primary duty must be to discern the intention of Parliament. We bear in mind first, and 
give great weight to, the provisions of section 5U) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 .. . We 
observe in passing that if any act ever called for a liberal and enabling interpretation, the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 must be it. 
The Tribunal concluded: 61 
.. . a literal approach to legislation enacted to promote the advancement of human rights is an 
unattractive prospect and one which we are not prepared to follow .... [I]n our view, the 
treatment of women in the workplace should be no less fair and enlightened than elsewhere in 
the common law world . Had we felt obliged to record a narrow and restrictive interpretation of 
this legislation, we would have regarded such a result as out of step with the temperament of 
modem society. 
Whilst that case concerned sexual harassment the general approach has since been 
approved in Proceedings Commissioner v Air New Zealand. 62 
60 
61 
62 
EOT 1/84 ; (1985) 5 NZAR 333 , 347. 
Above n60, 348. 
EOT 1/87 ; ( 1989) EOC 92-258 . 
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The Proceedings Commissioner v Air New Zealand case was a sex discrimination 
case brought under section 15(l)(b) 63 of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977. It 
was alleged that Air New Zealand had omitted to offer or afford to each complainant 
(17 female cabin crew) the same opportunities for promotions as were made available 
to men of substantially similar qualifications employed by Air New Zealand in the 
same or substantially similar circumstances in cabin crew work. However, in alleging 
sex discrimination the Proceedings Commissioner also relied, in the alternative, on 
section 27 of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977. Section 27 of that Act 
provided: 
Discrimination by subterfuge - Where a requirement or condition which is not apparently in 
contravention of any provision of this Part of this Act ... has the effect of giving preference to a 
person of a particular colour, race, ethnic or national origin, sex, marital status, or religious or 
ethical belief in a situation where such preference would be unlawful under any other provision 
of this Part of this Act ... , the imposition of that condition or requirement shall be unlawful 
under that provision unless the person imposing it establishes good reason for its imposition 
and shows that its imposition is not a subterfuge to avoid complying with that provision. 
In finding that the women had been denied equal promotional opportunities which 
were made available to their male counterparts, the Tribunal rejected the differences 
in ranks between the complainants and the males as being, in law, differences that 
were not material. However, in addition, the Tribunal stated that even if it were 
wrong in treating the case as one falling directly within the provisions of section 
15(1 )(b) it was satisfied that all the elements of section 27 had been met and stated: 64 
63 
64 
There can be no doubt but that the Airline's seniority system and the criteria which require 
promotion from rank to rank in accordance with seniority within rank, are requirements which 
have had the effect of giving preference to males in a situation where such preference would be 
Section 15( 1 )(b) of that Act provides: 
(I) It shall be unlawful for any person who is an employer, or any person acting or 
purporting to act on behalf of any person who is an employer, -
(b) To refuse or omit to offer or afford any person the same terms of employment, 
conditions or work, fringe benefits, and opportunities for training, promotion, and 
transfer as are made available for persons of the same or substantially similar 
qualifications employed in the same or substantially similar circumstances on 
work of that description; ... 
Above n62, 70. 
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unlawful under section 15(l)(b). That being the case, the onus is on Air NZ to justify the 
imposition of those requirements in terms contemplated by section 27 of the Act. 
We would accept that the imposition of those criteria is not a deliberate subterfuge to avoid 
complying with the provisions of section 15(l)(b) but we are not persuaded that there is any 
good reason for the imposition of those requirements. Accordingly, we find, in the alternative, 
that Air NZ has committed a breach of section 15(1 )(b) in respect of each complainant by virtue 
of the provisions of section 27 of the Act. 
It has been argued 65 that a defence under section 27 of .the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977 would be available where the institution could show that the 
imposition of a requirement or condition was not a subterfuge to avoid complying 
with a provision elsewhere in the Act. A defence would therefore only have meaning 
if the section is interpreted to mean conditions or requirements positively imposed. 
This seems to imply a deliberate action on the part of the employer to impose a 
requirement or condition, to avoid what appears overt discrimination elsewhere in the 
Act. The defence supposedly would therefore only cover situations where there is no 
deliberately imposed requirement or condition such as with an omission or where it 
was imposed unconsciously and for good reason but had the effect of discriminating 
against the complainant. 
Overseas jurisdictions have taken a similar approach to human rights legislation in 
adopting the idea of indirect ("adverse effect") discrimination. Canada, in particular, 
in seeking to prevent discrimination has also adopted the purposive approach to such 
legislation by rejecting the need to prove intent in all discrimination cases. There the 
Court has held that discrimination should be interpreted more widely than simply 
intentional discrimination: 66 
65 
66 
Generally human rights legislation has been given a broad interpretation to ensure that the 
stated objects and purposes are fulfilled. A narrow restrictive interpretation which would defeat 
the purposes of the legislation, that is, the elimination of discrimination, should be avoided. 
Paul Rishworth "Biculturalism, Multiculturalism, the Bill of Rights and the School Curriculum" 
in Education and the law in New Zealand (Legal Research Foundation, April 1993). 
Odeon Theatres Ltd v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commissioner ( 1985) 6 CHRR D/2682, 
D2686. 
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The emphasis on discriminatory effects has been held to be central to the purpose of 
the Ontario Human Rights Code in Ontario Human Rights Commission and O 'Malley 
v Simpsons-Sears Ltd in which the Supreme Court stated: 67 
The accepted rules of construction are flexible enough to enable the Court to recognize in the 
construction of a human rights code the special nature and purpose of the enactment ... and give 
to it an interpretation which will advance its broad purposes. Legislation of this type is of a 
special nature, ... and it is for the courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect ... It is the 
result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in fact, cause 
discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group of persons obligations, 
penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the community, it is 
discriminatory. 
B Section 65 of the Human Rights Act 
The difference between section 27 of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and 
the recently enacted section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993, is that the latter 
appears to have tightened up the former provision and is now also drafted more 
simply. Section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993 should therefore be more useful in 
that it includes any "conduct or practice", in addition to any requirement or condition, 
which has the effect of treating any person or group of persons differently in a 
situation which would be unlawful elsewhere in the Act on one of the prohibited 
grounds. 
Certainly it would seem that section 27 of the Human Rights Act 1977 was seldom 
relied upon in cases before the Commission under the Human Rights Commission 
Act 1977. Of the ten complaints investigated during the period 1978 to 1993 where 
that section was "notified", five were in the employment area, two of which were on 
the ground of sex, two on the ground of religion and one of the ground of age. 
68 
67 
68 
Above n53, 547. 
Figures provided by Human Rights Commission on 13 May 1994. "Notified" means formal 
notification of the complaint to the parties concerned. 
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It will be interesting to see how section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993 will be 
interpreted and what use will be made of it. However, it is a provision which is likely 
to be pleaded in the alternative when the Commission is notifying parties to the 
complaint of the alleged breaches under the Act. If the complainant is to be 
successful under this section, the Commission must be satisfied that there has been 
less favourable treatment on one of the grounds specified in the Act which has the 
effect of discriminating against that person or group of persons and would otherwise 
be discriminatory elsewhere in the Act. 
In companson, most overseas prov1s10ns have drafted complicated formulas m 
respect of indirect sex discrimination which have imposed some difficulties m 
interpretation. Despite these difficulties those indirect discrimination provisions 
generally constitute the most significant parts of the Acts they are found in. 
69 
It is submitted that such prov1s1ons, although defined by the narrowness of the 
statutory formula, are relevant in assessing how section 65 of the Human Rights Act 
1993 might be interpreted by both the Commission and Tribunal in New Zealand. In 
particular, those provisions may provide valuable guidance as to what "condition", 
"requirement" or "practice" means under section 65 of the Act. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of "justifiability" in Britain, "business necessity" in the United States 
and "bona fide occupational requirement" in Canada, argued as a defence to the 
imposed condition, requirement or practice, may also assist in predicting what might 
constitute "good reason" in New Zealand. The paper now examines the interpretation 
accorded those overseas provisions. 
69 Above n 15, 81; see Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (UK). 
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V OVERSEAS TREATMENT OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS 
A United Kingdom 
First, the United Kingdom provision in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 may provide 
useful precedent as to the meaning of a "requirement" or "condition". 
In that Act, indirect discrimination is said to occur where a person discriminates 
against a woman in any circumstances relevant for purposes of any provision in the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 if (Section 1(1)): 
(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to 
a man but: -
(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with it is 
considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it, and 
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex of the person to 
whom it is applied, and 
(iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it. 
A requirement or condition under that Act means that the application of any 
requirement or condition is something which must be complied with rather than being 
a mere preference. In other words, the requirement or condition must be a necessary 
criterion but if it is simply the practical outcome of any preference, such as word-of-
mouth recruiting, it will not be caught by the section, although it may be 
discriminatory. 70 
The British Tribunal has held the following circumstances to amount to indirect 
discrimination in employment: a condition that employment applicants pass a 
70 Above n 15, 82. 
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language test; 71 an employer's prohibition of trousers for women staff; 72 and a 
requirement of prior management experience as a condition for a grant. 73 
However, the prov1s10n has not been without its difficulties and it is to these 
difficulties that the paper next looks, particularly the issue of justifiability, in 
assessing what might constitute "good reason" in terms of section 65 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993. 
1 Compliance 
The difficulties of interpretation in Britain have mostly revolved around certain 
specific wording in the provision. The first of such wording is the words "can 
comply". In Price v Civil Service Commission. 74 Ms Price filed a complaint that she 
had been unlawfully discriminated against because she was told that in applying for a 
post as executive officer she was over the upper age limit of 28 years. She alleged 
that in imposing such an age limit for entry as an Executive Officer she was indirectly 
discriminated against as fewer women than men could comply with such a 
requirement because they were otherwise engaged in child rearing activities. The 
Tribunal held that as it was physically possible for women to comply with the 
condition there was no case to answer. 
Ms Price appealed that decision and the issue to be decided by the Court was whether 
the Tribunal was correct in its interpretation of the words "can comply" in section 
1 (1 )(b) of the Act. The EAT allowed the appeal because in its view it was necessary 
to see whether women could comply in practice, stating: 75 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Such a [narrow] construction appears to us to be wholly out of sympathy with the spirit and 
intent of the Act ... It should not be said that a person "can" do something merely because it is 
theoretically possible for him to do so. rt is necessary to see whether he can do so in practice. 
Ullah v British Steel [ 1979] I RLR 213. 
Kingston and Richmond Area Health Authority v Kaur [ 1981] ICR 515 (EAT); IRLR 337, 339. 
Ojutiku and Oburoni v Manpower Services Commission [ 1982] !CR 661 (CA). 
[1978] !CR 27 (EAT). 
Above n74, 31. 
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Applying this approach to the circumstances of this case, it is relevant in determining whether 
women can comply with the condition to take into account the current usual behaviour of 
women in this respect, as observed in practice, putting on one side behaviour and responses 
which are unusual or extreme. 
It would appear that the fact no women could comply with a requirement or condition 
will not constitute a bar to a claim of indirect discrimination. 76 
2 Justifiability 
Secondly, and more importantly, the word "justifiable" has been interpreted in the 
Britain in significantly different ways. In Steel v Union of Post Office Workers 77 the 
test of justifiability was held to mean it must be "necessary" for some purpose of the 
employer rather than simply convenient. Subsequently, this test was initially 
modified by applying the test "reasonably and with common sense" 78 and then 
rejected, being replaced instead with a test which involved looking at all the 
circumstances of a particular case to determine whether the requirement was "right 
and proper" in the circumstances. 79 Later cases appear to have reverted to a more 
objective approach which requires evidence "to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that 
the requirement is 'necessary' to achieve a legitimate demand of the employer". 80 
3 Detriment 
Lastly, it is unclear what the third element actually means but it has been suggested 
that it may be ambivalent. Does it require the woman to show she had been 
disadvantaged in some way by not being able to comply or does it mean that her 
inability to comply can of itself constitute detriment? 81 It may be, as McCrudden 
76 
77 
78 
79 
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suggests, simply a bar to complainants not personally adversely affected by the 
requirement or condition. 82 
Section 65 appears to have avoided this problem by simply requmng that any 
condition or requirement "has the effect" of treating a person or group of persons 
differently. It is submitted that the New Zealand wording places a lesser burden on 
complainants than those in Britain who may have to prove detriment. 
B United States 
As will be noted, much of the law in relation to indirect discrimination has been 
developed and influenced by American legal precedent which is why the paper 
focuses so much on case law from the United States and Canada. 
1 Doctrines of Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact 
Existing prov1s10ns m the United States covenng both direct and indirect 
discrimination are to be found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. Title VII 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, religion or national origin in 
any employment condition, including hiring, transfer, promotion, admission to 
training programmes, firing and compensation. 83 
Section 703(a), (h) of the Civil Rights Act 1964, as amended in 1972, provides: 
82 
83 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual , or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
colour, religion , sex or national origin; or 
Above n7, 355 . 
Rita Mae Kelly The Gendered Economy: Work, Careers, and Success (Sage Publications Inc, 
California, 1991) 14. 
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin .... 
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer ... to give and to act upon the results of any 
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action 
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, 
colour, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Not surprisingly, Title VII did not transform the workplace into one of equality as 
was hoped and as was the statute's purpose. In interpreting Title VII the United 
States Supreme Court has recognised the two concepts of discrimination for enforcing 
equality in the workplace namely, direct and indirect discrimination. These are 
commonly referred to as the "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" doctrines. 
The disparate treatment doctrine prohibits practices motivated by discriminatory 
intent by guaranteeing similar treatment for those who are similarly situated. 84 
The courts adopted the new meaning of discrimination in 1971, namely; "disparate 
impact", as being employment practices which, while neutral in their treatment of 
different groups, fell more harshly on one group than another and which the employer 
could not justify by business necessity. As a consequence, previous male biased job 
requirements, fair in form but discriminatory in operation, could now be evaluated in 
terms of prohibited practices. 85 
Assumptions about women being similarly situated were questioned during the 1980s 
and in particular, why only women who could act like men were held to be similarly 
situated. 86 It was argued at that time the standards used in comparing individuals in 
84 
85 
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discrimination cases were male ones of aggressiveness, dominance and 
competitiveness. 87 
Women, when they cannot or will not conform to male patterns of behaviour, remain outside 
the scope of its protection . ... Because these jobs are associated with the traits and lifest} les of 
men, employers fail to hire women who cannot or will not adopt ··male" standards of 
behaviour. Men therefore continue to dominate these positions, which, in turn, continue to be 
viewed as male and adapted to men. Women, meanwhile, remain trapped in the "pink collar" 
ghetto of the tabor market. 
Subsequently, the doctrine of "disparate impact" was expanded to include subjective, 
discretionary promotion systems that have a disparate impact on certain groups. 88 
In determining what criteria might be lawful the courts m the United States have 
adopted a business necessity test which states: 89 
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates .. . cannot be 
shown to be related to job performance the practice is prohibited. 
The courts were later required to interpret the meaning of "business necessity" and 
"job relatedness". These are worth evaluating for they may also be relevant in 
determining what the words "good reason" mean under section 65 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993. 
2 Business necessity 
The scope of "business necessity" as a test has, it appears, been interpreted in a 
narrow manner by the courts which have required a balancing approach to be taken 
between the disparate impact of an employer's practice and the benefits of that 
87 Above n83 , 15 where Kelly quotes Eichner in "Getting Women Work that Isn't Women ' s 
Work: Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII" (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1400, 
1404. 
88 Watson v Fort Worth Bank and Trust 108 S Ct 2777 ( 1988). 
89 Above n7, 335 see in particular the test adopted in Griggs v Duke Power Co; Above n8, 431 . 
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practice. 90 The reason for this is that the case of Griggs v Duke Power Company 
itself did not establish judicial standards for determining whether a practice is or is 
not a business necessity. 91 In particular, the Court failed to identify what business 
purposes would fall within the business necessity defence, what quantum and nature 
of proof was needed to show the nexus between the business purpose and means for 
achieving that purpose, and how necessary the business purpose must be. 92 
This has since been interpreted by lower courts as requiring the employer to satisfy 
the court on two accounts. First, that the condition or practice has been validated and 
secondly, that there was no acceptable alternative having a less exclusionary effect. 93 
Validated conditions or practices would involve employers ensurmg that those 
conditions or practices are related to the job requirements. That would require the 
employer to specify the particular trait or characteristic which the condition or 
requirement is being used to identify or measure, that the trait or characteristic is an 
important element of work behaviour and moreover, to demonstrate by professionally 
accepted methods that the requirement or condition is predictive or correlated 
significantly with the work behaviour elements identified in the middle step. 94 
C Canada 
Again, it is useful to examine the approach taken by the Canadian courts in that 
section 7(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1985 RSC refers to discriminatory 
practices such as a policy or practice. Section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993 has 
now incorporated the word "practice" in its coverage. Furthermore, what is 
considered a "bona fide occupational requirement" defence in Canada may have 
applicability to the "good reason" defence in the New Zealand provision. 
90 
91 
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93 
94 
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Section 7(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1985 RSC provides that: 
It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly ... 
(b) in the course of employment, to differentiate adversely in relation to an employee, 
on a prohibited ground of discrimination . 
Section 10 of the Act reads: 
It is a discriminatory practice for an employer ... 
(a) to establish or pursue a policy or practice, or 
(b) to enter into an agreement affecting recruitment, referral , hiring, promotion, training, 
apprenticeship, transfer, or any other matter relating to employment or prospective 
employment. 
That deprives or tends to deprive an individual or class of individuals of any employment 
opportunities on a prohibited ground of discrimination. 
The term "prohibited ground of discrimination" which appears in both sections 7 and 
1 O of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1985 RSC is defined in section 3 of that Act. 
It includes discrimination on the grounds of "sex" as does the New Zealand provision. 
1 Bona Fide Occupational Requirement 
The Canadian Human Rights Act 1985 RSC also provides a nun1ber of statutory 
exceptions in employment contexts, which are set out in section 14 of that Act. The 
issues surrounding interpretation of those statutory exceptions have not been 
dissimilar to the issues which have arisen in the United States. 
Pursuant to section 14(a) of that Act the defendant may argue as a defence that the 
practice is a "bona fide occupational requirement". Such a bona fide occupational 
-33-
requirement imposed by the employer would include a requirement that the policy or 
practice is implemented for either the safety of workers or the public. What might be 
considered justifiable as a bona fide occupational requirement has been interpreted by 
the Canadian Court as involving the balancing of the rights of the parties to the 
discrimination in placing a duty on the employer to accommodate the needs of the 
employee short of undue hardship. 95 
In cases of "adverse effect" discrimination there is said to be no question of justification raised 
"because the rule, if rationally connected to the employment needs no justification." The 
threshold question is whether the practice or rule is one of "business rationality" or "business 
necessity". If it is, the employer is bound to undertake some measure of accommodation to 
meet the special needs of the employee who is the victim of the discriminatory practice or rule. 
He is not, however, required to go beyond what in the circumstances is "reasonable 
accommodation". He is not bound to jeopardize his own business nor to engage in undue 
expense in the process of accommodating the employee. If reasonable accommodation does 
not meet the need of the employee to protect his rights, then he may have to choose between his 
employment or his ... principles. 
The next question is how one goes about establishing a prima facie case of indirect 
discrimination in New Zealand. Because section 65 of the Act requires the effect to 
have been one where such treatment would be unlawful under any provision 
elsewhere in the Act, it is necessary to first consider how a prima facie case of direct 
discrimination is established. 
95 Above n42, para 39478. 
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VI ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
A prima facie case of direct discrimination can be established by evidence which 
comprises both oral testimony and witness statements or similar fact evidence (the 
usual mode of adducing evidence in human rights cases) or alternatively, through 
circumstantial evidence. In the United States the Courts have held that statistical 
evidence alone may be sufficient 96 but generally cases are established there by a 
combination of oral testimony and statistical evidence. New Zealand has to date 
rarely relied on statistics as has been done in the United States. 
However, many complainants are unable to show direct evidence that they have been 
treated less favourably because of their sex or race, particularly in employment, 
because they must rely entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination. 
In such situations, discrimination can be established by inferences drawn from 
circumstantial evidence taking into account all the facts, each of which by itself might 
be insufficient to permit an inference, but considered together may justify it. Often it 
is necessary to refer to overseas precedent to establish whether or not discrimination 
can be established on the facts. 
In the United States, the courts initially developed a method to analyse and prove 
cases of direct discrimination because of the difficulty in establishing "intent". 97 
Although this method is no longer used in establishing cases where direct evidence of 
discrimination is available, it is used for cases reliant on circumstantial evidence. 
Accordingly, it is useful to examine this method, particularly as cases of indirect 
discrimination are only established on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 
In particular, a plaintiff had to establish a prima facie case that she had been 
discriminated against by her employer, for promotion, by demonstrating the 
following: 98 
(1) 
(2) 
96 
97 
98 
that the complainant (she) was a member of a protected class; 
that she was qualified for the position; 
Above n52; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Akron National Bank 497 F Supp 
733 ( 1980) in which the Court held that where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they 
alone may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination. 
Lynn Smith (Ed) Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights (The Canadian Human 
Rights Reporter Inc, Saskatchewan, 1986) 284-289. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green 411 US 792 ( 1973). 
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(3) that she was not promoted into a job for which she was qualified; and 
( 4) that the position was given to a male. 
The cases below illustrate how this method was applied to cases of direct 
discrimination. 
In Willis v Watson Chapel School District 99 a female teacher, repeatedly denied 
promotions to administrative positions, established a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination in that she demonstrated she was a member of a protected class, she 
applied for and qualified for each position at issue and in every case a male was hired 
to fill the position. Furthermore, the males who were hired were recommended to an 
all-male school board by a male superintendent who, it was clear, used subjective 
criteria in determining who he should recommend. 
In Ezold v Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen 100 the Court held that a law firm's 
denial of partnership to a woman was unlawful discrimination in that the plaintiff 
made out a prima facie case of promotion discrimination by showing that both her 
evaluations by partners working closely with her and a memorandum summarising 
her reviews established her qualification for partnership but that several male 
associates with lesser evaluations were made partners. 
In Smart v Columbia Gas System Service Corporation 101 a female employee was 
denied promotion to the position of senior financial tax analyst because of her sex and 
not because a male had arguably better qualifications. The Court found she had been 
eliminated from the promotion process, despite having expressed her interest and 
undertaken training, before the male was even considered. In making its finding the 
Court said the successful male's "subsequent superlative performance in the job is 
simply beside the point". In all, five female candidates were each denied in-depth 
examination of their qualifications given to even the unsuccessful male candidates. 
In Downey v Isaac 102 a promotion action challenged by an unsuccessful female 
college graduate, with various qualifications, was held not to be unlawful sex 
discrimination. The Court concluded that while the complainant met a threshold 
99 
100 
IOI 
102 
50 EPD 38,958 (1988). 
55 EPD 40,497 ( 1990). 
42 EPD 36,90 I ( 1986). 
38 EPD 35,573 (1985). 
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showing of sex discrimination, sex was not a factor in the decision not to promote her. 
The employer "demonstrated by persuasive testimony and evidence that the plaintiff 
was less qualified by training and experience". 103 There was no evidence that the 
claimant was treated in any manner different from other applicants for promotion. 
It would appear that the prima facie method established in McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation v Green 104 was "never intended to be rigid, mechanised or ritualistic 
[but] merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common 
experience as it [bore] on the critical question of discrimination". 105 
As a consequence, the United States Supreme Court has now restricted use of the 
method to cases where the plaintiff is unable to produce direct evidence of 
discrimination. However, if the plaintiff is relying on circumstantial evidence, a 
prime facie case can be established by showing the following: 
(1) she belongs to a minority (because of that individual's race, colour, religion, sex 
or national origin); 
(2) she applied and was qualified for the job in which the employer was seeking 
applicants; 
(3) despite her qualifications she was rejected; and 
(4) after her rejection the position remained open and the employer continued to 
seek applicants from persons of the complainant's qualifications. 
In Mitchell v Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce 106 the Court of Appeals held that the 
issue in a case of an allegedly discriminatory failure to promote is not the objective 
superiority or inferiority of the plaintiffs qualifications but rather whether the 
defendant's selection criteria are non-discriminatory. In applying the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case formulation to the District Court's facts it held the plaintiff 
did make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Mitchell was black and Hispanic, 
Mitchell applied for a position of computer systems analyst, the selection panel rated 
Mitchell as qualified but Mitchell was rejected for the position and ultimately, a white 
103 Above n 102, 39,554. 
104 Above n98. 
105 United States Postal Service Board of Governors v Aikens 460 US 711 ( 1983). 
106 36 EPD 35,109 (1985). 
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male was chosen. It held the District Court had based its dismissal of Mitchell's 
discrimination charges on its findings that the people selected for the vacancies at 
issue were better qualified than the plaintiff but in doing so incorrectly assumed that 
the plaintiff had to prove as part of the prima facie case that he was as qualified or 
more qualified than those selected. 
The courts have also recognised that a discriminatory atmosphere at the plaintiffs 
employment could serve as circumstantial evidence of individual discrimination. In 
Parker v Secretary, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
107 the Court of Appeals remanded that case back to the District Court for more 
detailed findings of fact. But in doing so it held that the lower Court had applied 
incorrect legal standards regarding proof of pretext and that evidence relevant to 
demonstrating pretext for an employer's adverse action might include showing that 
"materially similarly situated" white or male employees did not receive the same 
adverse action received by a coloured employee, by showing facts as to the 
employer's treatment of the employee during the term of employment, and by the 
employer's general policy and practice with respect to employment of minority 
groups, including women, against whom discrimination was prohibited. 
In Conway v Electro Switch Corporation 108 the Court held that circumstantial 
evidence that the employee's position was never listed and that the female employee 
had never been considered for the supervisory position, even though by most accounts 
she was hard working, competent and a loyal employee (amongst other circumstantial 
evidential facts), supported the jury inference that the employer fostered an 
atmosphere of discrimination that affected its personnel decisions. 109 
A claim of discrimination need not be proven solely through direct evidence; circumstantial 
evidence may support an inference of discrimination . ... Indeed, discrimination can often be of 
such a subtle, insidious character that a plaintiff may only be able to offer circumstantial 
evidence to buttress his or her claim. As this court has ruled, circumstantial evidence of a 
discriminatory atmosphere at a plaintiffs place of employment is relevant to the question of 
motive in considering a discrimination claim. While evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere 
may not be conclusive proof of discrimination against an individual plaintiff, such evidence 
does tend to add "colour" to the employer's decision making processes and to the influences 
behind the actions taken with respect to the individual plaintiff. 
107 52 EPD 39,499 (1989); 891 F 2d 316, 322 (1989) . 
I 08 825 F 2d 593 ( 1987). 
I 09 Above n I 08, 597. 
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In a subsequent case, Townsend v Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority, 110 the District Court held that irregularities in the selection process by the 
defendant and a generally discriminatory atmosphere demonstrated that the allegedly 
superior qualifications of a successful male candidate were a pretext to deny 
promotion to a qualified female employee because of her sex. In that case the female 
plaintiff, after answering cursory questions, was eliminated from further consideration 
without being granted another interview, despite her evaluations and recommendation 
by the rating panel. Two males were selected. At that time women made up only 5% 
of the upper level positions in the department and there was a common feeling 
amongst women that they were being bypassed for promotion despite their 
qualification. The Court stated: 111 
... the plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of evidence that, at the time of the selection 
process, WMA TA did not fairly and objectively compare the plaintiffs qualifications for the 
CDS position with those of Wilson and Lamb .... Because WMA TA never engaged in that kind 
of analysis at the time, WMATA's insistence that a careful weighing of the applicants' 
qualifications would prove that its failure to promote the plaintiff was nondiscriminatory is 
merely a post hoe rationalization that "carries the seeds of its own destruction." (Bishopp v 
District of Columbia 788 F. 2d 781, 789 ... 1986). 
The United States Supreme Court held: 112 
[T]he prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these 
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of 
impermissible factors". Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption 
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes 
the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court 
must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case. 
To establish a case of indirect discrimination under section 65 of the Human Rights 
Act 1993, the complainant must show that a neutral employment practice, 
requirement, condition or conduct had the effect of treating either a person or group 
of persons differently on one of the prohibited grounds listed in section 21 (which 
treatment would be considered unlawful elsewhere in the Act). The respondent must 
110 
111 
112 
54 EPD 40,323 ( 1990). 
Above nl 10, 64,507. 
Above n97, 286 see quote citing Texas Department of Community Affairs v Burdine 450 US 
248,254 (1981). 
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then establish "good reason" why such a conduct, practice, condition or requirement 
was imposed. 
It seems likely that the method adopted in the United States to establish a prima facie 
case based on circumstantial evidence will provide guidance in cases of indirect 
discrimination in New Zealand. However, even accepting the presumption of a prima 
facie case using this method, there remain evidential difficulties in demonstrating this 
which I will now elaborate on. 
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VII EVIDENTIAL I SUE 
The e\'identiary difficulties in pro\'ing a ea e of indirect di crimination imp e a 
further major limitation to the effecti\'eness of ection 6- of the Human Right A t 
1993. The specific issues to be discussed in thi Part of the paper include the burden 
of proof and the type of evidence that might be presented in uch case . 
A Burden of Proof 
In cases of direct discrimination the burden of proof remains on the complainant at all 
times. However, if the complainant is reliant on circumstantial eYidence and a prima 
facie case is established then the burden of proof shifts to the re pondent- mployer. 
If the employer is able to offer sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of a prima 
facie case "the factual enquiry" then reverts back onto the complainant again to pro\'e, 
by a preponderance of evidence, that this is not the true rea on but a pretext for the 
discriminatory reason. 113 
The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually moti ated b} the proffered 
reasons .... It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, 
through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiffs rejection. 
Reasons proffered by the employer to negate the pnma facie presumption of 
discrimination, have been summarised by Smith: 114 
... lesser comparative qualifications, attitude problems, effeminism, personal differences with a 
supervisor or other employees, lack of diligence, inability to command respect and maintain 
discipline, political considerations, budgetary constraints, and instances or misconduct and 
disloyalty ... lack of reliability, misconduct, failure to take a pol}graph examination, lack of 
friendship with the employer, poor responses in oral interviews, unsatisfactory performance on 
psychological tests, and age. 
Proof of pretext by an individual complainant might include facts about the 
employer's treatment of the plaintiff during his/her employment, and evidence as to 
113 Above n97, 286; see also Above n 112, in particular, Burdine 254-254. 
114 Above n97, 291 where Smith quotes Barbara L Schlei and Paul Gossman m Employment 
Discrimination Law (2ed, United States, 1983). 
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the employer's general policy and practice with respect to minority employment. It is 
therefore up to the complainant to persuade the Court, by a preponderance of 
evidence, that the action or policy was likely to be motivated by a discriminatory 
reason or that the employer's explanation is unworthy of credence. 115 
In cases of indirect discrimination no proof of intent is required 116 and once a prima 
facie case is established the burden of proof shifts to the respondent. 
In discussing the onus of proof in indirect discrimination the Canadian Court has 
approved of McIntyre J' s statement: 111 
[T]here must be a clearly-recognized and clearly-assigned burden of proof in these cases as in 
all civil proceedings. To whom should it be assigned? Following the well-settled rule in civil 
cases, the plaintiff bears the burden. He who alleges must prove. Therefore, under the 
Etobicoke rule as to burden of proof, the showing of a prima facie case of discrimination, I see 
no reason why it should not apply in cases of adverse effect discrimination. 
As mentioned, indirect discrimination involves practices that are fair in form but 
discriminatory in operation. Accordingly, there will be no direct evidence and the 
complainant must rely entirely on circumstantial evidence. In America and Canada, 
once the complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to 
the employer-respondent to prove the practice or requirement is "job related" or 
justified by "business necessity" by persuading the Court of this by a preponderance 
of evidence: 118 
The Arizona Court has stated, in relation to the defendant's burden of proof: 11 9 
In disparate impact suits, the burden is placed on the defendant to establish the defence of 
business necessity and it is a much heavier burden than merely articulating a legitimate non 
discriminatory reason for hiring decisions. 
115 Above n97, 288. 
116 Above n52. 
117 Above n42, para 39473 and the quote of McIntyre Jin O 'Malley; Above n53 . 
118 Above n42, paras 39447 and 39478. 
119 Above n83 , 200 see Kelly's quote cited in Arizona Department of law v Amphitheatre School 
District. 
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This lessens the complainant's onus of proof and is particularly helpful as the 
evidence necessary to prove discrimination is not always accessible to the 
complainant because the knowledge is often in the respondent's possession. 120 
Any practice, however, must be shown to have a causal connection with the 
imbalance. 121 How then does the complainant go about obtaining the evidence 
necessary to do this? Evidence commonly relied upon includes anecdotal, 
documentary, comparative and statistical evidence, but such evidence is unfortunately 
not without its inherent difficulties which, as will be seen below, can work against 
women complainants. It is submitted these difficulties are, apart from the limitations 
of the formal equality principle the legislation is premised on, the other major 
impediment to the effectiveness of provisions such as section 65 of the Human Rights 
Act, particularly for women. 
B Evidence Presented 
Under Part III of the Human Rights Act 1993, complaints of unlawful discrimination 
are investigated by the Complaints Division of the Human Rights Commission in the 
first instance. The aim of the investigation is to ascertain the truth of the facts in a 
private and confidential manner. The Complaints Division is able to hear or obtain 
information as it thinks fit 122 and it is not necessary for it to hold any hearing. 123 In 
most cases respondents are co-operative and willing to assist and in doing so, produce 
the necessary documents freely to the Commission. The process is aimed at avoiding 
the adversary system of the courts and the strict legal rules of admissibility of 
evidence. 
In investigating any complaint the parties are given the opportunity to state their 
version of the facts and this is subsequently corroborated by witness statements. In 
the case of unlawful discrimination in employment, the complainant will need to 
produce evidence that he/she has been discriminated against by showing, in the case 
of an alleged failure to promote, that he/she was treated differently to another in 
similarly situated circumstances. In cases of indirect discrimination this can only be 
done by using circumstantial evidence from which an inference can be drawn. As 
120 Chris Ronalds Anti-Discrimination legislation in Australia (Butterworths Pty Ltd, Australia, 
1979) 142. 
121 Above n52. 
122 Above n5, section 78(3). 
123 Above n5, section 78(4). 
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will be seen below it is often difficult for the complainant to do this in that there are 
technical difficulties in terms of the identification of others who may have been 
similarly affected or who for one reason or another may not wish to come forward 
and provide evidence. 
I Oral Testimony 
In employment cases in particular, it is crucial to ensure that there is evidence in the 
form of oral testimony to support the complainant's allegations. Such oral testimony 
would include others of the same protected group who have been affected in a similar 
way to the complainant. It is evidence which establishes the complainant's 
allegations, without any reliance upon documentary evidence, indicating 
discriminatory behaviour or practices which may only be held by the respondent. 
Witnesses can confirm the respondent-employer's practices or conduct as having 
adversely affected them by showing a pattern of discrimination over time, particularly 
in relation to hiring or promotion procedures. This is important in cases where the 
respondent is a small company and too small for adequate comparison or statistical 
study, or involves highly trained applicants for high-level positions. 124 Absence of 
oral witness testimony, corroborating the complainant's allegations, can work against 
a successful outcome. 
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Sears, Roebuck and Co 125 despite 
being a graphic example of occupational segregation, where women were denied the 
opportunity of being hired and promoted to higher paid commission sales positions, 
as illustrated by undisputed statistical evidence, the Court held that Sears had not 
discriminated unlawfully. The basis for the decision revolved around the perceived 
choices and aspirations of women in that workforce, namely: that women were much 
less likely than their male counterparts to be interested in those positions. 
In that case, evidence of structural disadvantage was transformed into evidence of 
"choice" against women. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") argued that the disproportionate number of women in commission sales 
jobs was due solely to direct discrimination. Sears' expert witness, Rosalind 
Rosenberg (a feminist historian) argued that the disparity shown by the statistical 
evidence could be justified on the ground that women's attributes, namely their 
nurturing, caring and non-competitive traits meant women's interests were not 
124 
125 
Blake v Mimico Correctional Institute Ontario (I 984) 5 CHRR D 2417 para 20097. 
628 F Supp 1264 (I 986). 
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identical to those of men and those differences accounted for the statistical disparity 
between the numbers of women and men in commission sales positions. 
EEOC on the other hand, through another expert historian, Alice Kessler-Harris, 
argued that women had the same interests as men but submitted that to argue that 
women's occupations in the workforce were a product of women's "choice" was both 
the employer's excuse and manipulation of her workforce experiences. 126 It is 
apparent that the absence of oral testimony by any one of Sears' female employees, as 
supporting evidence of discrimination, was fatal to the case. 
Similarly, in an earlier class action case 127 where the EEOC alleged racial and sexual 
discrimination against a meat packing company, the Court held that statistical 
evidence may be buttressed with direct evidence of discriminatory policies and 
procedures and individual instances of discrimination. However, in that case, the 
employer persuaded the Court that women were not automatically excluded from jobs 
which required heavy lifting by demonstrating that women were generally 
uninterested in those jobs. This, together with the absence of any testimony by a 
female employee that she was denied a transfer request for a job for which she was 
qualified, was sufficient to rebut the EEOC's prima facie case of classwide 
discrimination that the employer had assigned jobs and maintained segregated 
departments based upon sex. 
2 Similar Fact Evidence 
Similar fact evidence is a useful tool often used in cases before the Commission. In 
the case of indirect discrimination, testimony obtained from past employees may well 
assist in establishing evidence of an employer's conduct, requirements or practices 
having had a discriminatory effect. 
Normally, similar fact evidence is not considered admissible in a court because its 
prejudicial effect is seen to outweigh its probative value. However, pursuant to 
section 106 of the Human Rights Act 1993, the Tribunal may receive as evidence 
"any statement ... that may in its opinion assist it to deal effectively with the matters 
before it whether or not admissible in a Court of Law". The Commission appears to 
be of the view that admissibility in the Tribunal is the yardstick to be used when 
forming an "opinion" on a complaint. If a particular testimony is questionable then, 
126 
127 
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appears direct discrimination cases can be proved by a "gross statistical" disparity 
alone. 133 In cases of indirect discrimination, statistics that are "markedly 
disproportionate" 134 or are "significantly discriminatory" are sufficient. 135 
A complainant might use statistics to show seemingly inoffensive employment 
practices are different from what they appear, for example, sexual disparities in hiring 
and promotion procedures; that subjective and discretionary decisions by employers 
are made in a discriminatory manner; that tests and requirements imposed by the 
employer have a discriminatory impact; and that an employer's discriminatory reason 
for rejecting an applicant is a cover-up for a discriminatory reason. 136 
A respondent might also use statistical evidence to rebut the complainant's prima 
facie case by showing that the requirement or practice at issue is a bona fide 
occupational requirement, is job-related or that discrimination is justified. 137 
Where the disparate impact doctrine has been used in the United States to establish an 
individual action, rather than a class action, the complainant has been required to 
show that she personally was the victim of discrimination by the general practice 
which allegedly resulted in a discriminatory impact on the protected group. 138 
Statistics may provide her with evidence of the disparities between the number of 
women employed in a particular job and the number of qualified women in the labour 
market. But that statistical evidence must bear a relationship to the specific charge 
that is being tried. 139 
The inherent difficulty, alluded to earlier in the paper, is that the statistical pool to be 
relied upon as the choice of the base group for comparison will ultimately cause 
differences in outcome. Consequently, the determination of the relevant labour group 
as a pool of comparison is particularly crucial. 140 
In Britain at least, the choice of labour pools for comparison is a question of fact for 
the Industrial Tribunal to determine. Unfortunately, this will depend on the 
133 Above n97, 294. 
134 Above n97, 294; Above n8, 424. 
135 Above n97, 294 see Dothard v Rawlinson 433 US 321, 329 (1977). 
136 Above nl24, para 20097. 
137 Above n 124, para 20098. 
138 Coe v Yellow Freight System Inc 646 F 2d 444,446 (1981); cf Above nl24, para 20103 where 
employer-respondent might rebut a prima facie case established by statistics by showing the 
complainant was not personally discriminated against. 
139 Above n138, 452. 
140 Above nl27, 542. 
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Tribunal's own subjective views as to what are the relevant comparison groups. If 
this view differs from that of the complainant, when compiling statistical evidence, 
then she may fail to prove indirect discrimination "even though had the appropriate 
comparison been made, the statistics might have supported the complaint". 141 
Statistics therefore, may relate to the population at large, a particular workplace or to 
the workforce in issue. 142 
Fortunately, New Zealand has not yet had to contend with the issue of statistical 
evidence but it is probable that statistical evidence will be relied upon increasingly, 
particularly in cases where emphasis has been placed on subjective evaluation 
processes instituted by the respondent-employer which often have the effect of 
favouring the incumbent class (males) at the expense of the minority (females). 
However, statistics should be regarded as merely one form of circumstantial evidence 
from which inferences of discriminatory conduct may be drawn. In particular, 
statistics are not irrefutable and like other evidence can be rebutted. 
I now provide a case illustration to exemplify how section 65 of the Act might be 
applied to a fact situation by demonstrating the presumption of a prima facie case and 
the evidence needed to establish that. 
141 Colin Bourn and John Whitmore The law of Discrimination and Equal Pay (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1989) 38. 
142 Abovenl41,38. 
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VIII CASE ILLUSTRATION 
The following synopsis illustrates the type of situation which is likely to fall within 
section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993, including the need at times to rely on 
overseas jurisprudence to support the establishment of a prima facie case on the facts 
where the case is partially dependent on circumstantial evidence. 
(a) The Facts 
The complainant was a female manager in a large corporate organisation. She alleged 
that despite showing an interest in a newly created senior management position she 
was denied promotion because she was a woman. That position was within the head 
office of the organisation which had other offices throughout the country. The 
respondent was head of one of the divisions in the Head Office. At no time was the 
complainant asked to submit her curriculum vitae or an application after having 
informed the respondent, who was responsible for selection, that she believed she was 
the most qualified and experienced person in that organisation for the position. 
Following the appointment of a male to the position, recruited from outside the 
organisation, the complainant's responsibilities were effectively reduced although her 
salary remained the same. She eventually resigned. 
In support of her allegations, the complainant also named several other women whom 
she believed had been treated in a similar discriminatory manner. She alleged that the 
respondent disliked women and had failed previously to promote other female 
employees. 
Evidence was collected about the complainant's experience and skill base, including 
favourable performance appraisals and assessments by supervisors of her previous 
positions, both permanent and relieving, over the time she had worked for the 
organisation. 
The respondent and his employer ("the respondents") argued in defence that the 
successful male who had ultimately been appointed to the position had both the 
necessary experience together with special skills in one particular area regarded 
important for the job. The complainant's experience in the same area was limited to 
two brief periods of relieving in that particular area. The respondents also argued that 
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the male's subsequent superlative performance in the job indicated he was
 the best 
person for the job. 
Evidence was also obtained from the other named women who were allegedl
y treated 
in a similar manner. In each case, the individual respondent had played som
e part in 
who was appointed to the vacant positions but all positions involved a prom
otion for 
those women. None were appointed although they had also expressed intere
st in the 
positions. 
It became evident from the evidence that there was no formalised proce
dure for 
advertising vacant positions within the higher levels of the organisation. Us
ually the 
personnel department would be notified of a position becoming available by 
the head 
of the division concerned. There were no written or standard guidelines co
ncerning 
requirements or qualifications for job applicants. If a particular candid
ate was 
thought acceptable for the position, the personnel department would refer the
 name of 
the person to the divisional head where the person worked, who would the
n decide 
whether to make a recommendation or not. 
Opportunities for promotion were therefore communicated solely by word o
f mouth. 
An employee would not be considered for promotion unless recommende
d by the 
head of the division. Any employee desiring to be considered for a particular
 position 
was nevertheless expected to communicate this desire to the head of the 
division 
where the position had arisen. 
The evidence also indicated that promotion decisions were actually made b
y the all 
male divisional heads in consultation with personnel. In making a dec
ision of 
whether to promote a particular employee, consideration was given to their a
bility to 
get along with others, customer relations and past performance. No tra
nsparent 
objective criteria were used at the time of selection to assess the candidates. 
None of 
the women were given an interview although nor were some men. 
It was contended by the respondents that they were aware and familiar 
with the 
women's work and skills. However, there was a common feeling among
 all the 
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women, including both former and current employees, that women w
ere being 
bypassed for promotion despite their qualifications. Moreover, there were
 no women 
in the upper level positions although there was a clear occupational seg
regation of 
women in the lower level jobs. 
2 Process 
The evidential issues raised in this synopsis are essentially those caused b
y a lack of 
direct evidence that the individual respondent had discriminated a
gainst the 
complainant in her non-promotion to the senior management position. 
This was 
compounded by a reluctance of the former women employees to get involv
ed for fear 
of jeopardising their present employment and damaging their reputation in
 the market 
place. There were other difficulties in obtaining evidence from the respon
dent's male 
colleagues within the higher levels of the organisation, concerning perce
ptions and 
comments allegedly made to the women that the respondent did not l
ike women 
working for him. In addition, the respondents could provide no docum
entation or 
material relating to the appointment at issue ( other than the succes
sful male's 
curriculum vitae) and simply produced a score sheet, collated some tim
e after the 
event, insisting that the subsequent careful weighing of the applicant's qu
alifications 
proved that its failure to promote the complainant was non-discriminatory. 
In assessing the circumstantial evidence, it is useful to look at overseas jur
isprudence 
to determine whether or not a prima facie could be established on the facts
. It would 
seem that in drawing an inference from all the facts, there would be
 sufficient 
evidence to form an opinion that the respondents had, on the balance of pr
obabilities, 
143 discriminated against the complainant pursuant to section 22(1)(a), (b) 
(c) and (d) 
143 Civil standard of proof required in New Zealand cases before the C
ommission and Tribunal. 
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of the Human Rights Act 1993. 144 As will be noted, much of the case-law already 
discussed in this paper would be relevant. 
It seems clear from the evidence that the respondents used a subjective evaluation 
procedure in its promotion practices which was discriminatory in its effect. In the 
United States the plaintiffs burden would be established by showing by a 
preponderance of evidence, that the sex discrimination practice was the respondent's 
standard operating procedure. In other words, the regular practice rather than the 
unusual. 145 Accordingly, the burden would then shift to the respondents to articulate 
some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the failure to promote the complainant. 
If the respondents were not capable of meeting this burden because they could not 
produce evidence to support an assertion that the complainant lacked the special skills 
required in one particular area of the job then their reason could be argued to be a 
pretext for the real reason for her non-promotion. Certainly the oral testimony of the 
other women, as similar fact evidence, would support an opinion of discrimination on 
the basis of sex. 
144 Section 22(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993, provides: 
(I) Where an applicant for employment or an employee is qualified for work of any 
description, it shall be unlawful for an employer, or any person acting or purporting to 
act on behalf of an employer, -
(a) To refuse or omit to employ the applicant on work of that description which is 
available; or 
(b) To offer or afford the applicant or the employee less favourable terms of 
employment, conditions of work, superannuation or other fringe benefits, and 
opportunities for training, promotion, and transfer than are made available to 
applicants or employees of the same or substantially similar capabilities 
employed in the same or substantially similar circumstances on work of that 
description; or 
(c) To terminate the employment of the employee, or subject the employee to any 
detriment, in circumstances in which the employment of other employees 
employed on work of that description would not be terminated, or in which other 
employees employed on work of that description would not be subjected to such 
detriment; or 
(d) To retire the employee, or to require or cause the employee to retire or resign, -
by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination ... . 
145 Above n 130. 
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(c) Section 65 
It would appear that section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993, would be satisfied on 
the ground that the promotion procedure is capable of being a requirement or 
condition 146 for the purposes of that section and the defendants had offered no good 
reason for the imposition of such a requirement or condition. Alternatively, it seems 
both the promotion procedure as an employment "practice" and the "conduct" of the 
individual respondent would fit comfortably within the latter terms. 
The alleged discrimination by the individual respondent in failing to either interview 
or assess the complainant at the time of selection and in particular, by not fairly or 
objectively comparing her qualifications for the position with that of the successful 
male would, it is submitted, be sufficient to form an opinion, on the balance of 
probabilities, that if not deliberate, the respondent's conduct certainly had the effect 
of discriminating against the complainant. Moreover, the respondents would need to 
ensure they provided sufficient evidence to support their actions in order to establish a 
good reason in terms of that section. 
146 Above n59, Watches of Switzerland. 
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IX CONCLUSION 
While it is accepted there are senous limitations inherent in a prov1s1on such as 
section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993, it seems probable more use will be made of 
it in future than was made of the repealed section 27 of the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977. The section should assist complainants in both individual and 
group actions 147 to obtain redress for discriminatory actions and practices against 
employers and for that reason, has some potential. Its remedial effect, apart from 
prevention, has been reduced by the Court's prohibition in allowing the Tribunal to 
make an order that equal opportunity programmes be put in place where such 
discrimination has occurred. 148 The recent ruling significantly undermines the 
legislature's recognition that discrimination involves something more than simply 
prejudicial behaviour. With respect, this decision endorses the structural nature of 
discrimination in the workplace. 
Moreover, the present prov1s10n fails to challenge the structural nature of 
discrimination. Structural change itself will only come about by implementing 
stronger legislative measures that focus on equality of outcome, rather than 
procedural equality, and acknowledge the public and private spheres of women's lives 
in particular. This will require more than simply a change in the workplace structure 
but a change that carries over into the social and cultural areas of their life. 
Any affirmative restructuring of course, must address the workplace structure to 
ensure not only the same opportunity for all but the best opportunity for all, 149 by 
recognising each individual's difference and accommodating that within a more 
humane structure. 1 so 
147 
148 
149 
ISO 
[Any] restructuring [must reach] beyond gender issues: it is not simply a matter of adding 
women to work and men to family, or integrating the values of each sphere to reflect the other, 
Above n5 , section 83(2). 
Above n32. 
Aboven13 , 139. 
Abovenl3 , 171. LA.W Lt\:lrt ;. UNGlU 
v1crroR1A UNIVE.RS11'f Or 'V~E. 
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but requires rethinking and changing work and family and their relationship to each other by 
imagining that relationship without the framework of gender. 
Dowd suggests this could be done by requiring " that legislation neither be based 
upon nor promote or perpetuate social/cultural constructs of gender" 151 and would 
require legislation that extended the stereotyping concern to a broader concern and 
deflected the focus away from assumptions about the construction of the structure to 
the impact of the existing reality of that structure. 152 
It is submitted that section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993 is a significant step in 
the right direction and may not pose the problems of interpretation that have arisen 
overseas. However, this forward step now needs to be matched by legislative changes 
that both amend the remedial effects of the section together with providing legal 
recognition that discrimination, particularly against women, is a structural problem 
within our gendered society. 
This might be achieved in several ways. First, the present Act must be amended to 
permit the Tribunal to grant orders compelling respondents to implement equal 
opportunity programmes to prevent further discrimination occurring. 
Secondly, the legislation must refocus away from the formal notion of equality of 
opportunity to that of equality of respect. 153 This would allow every person to be 
entitled to be treated in a manner that recognised each individual's worth. 154 
Equality of respect and treatment theories ... open possibilities for change that go beyond the 
market system and they thereby serve ... "to bring to life latent needs which society has 
repressed, valid for every aspect of the relation of the individual to his work, to social 
production, and to society as a complex environment of natural and cultural relationships". 
151 Above n13, 167. 
152 Above n13, 167-168. 
153 Above nl3, 140. 
154 Above n 13, 140 see footnote 202, Elshtain "The Feminist Movement and the Question of 
Equality" ( 1975) 7 Polity 452, 454. 
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Thirdly, the legislation should be used to mandate the integration of minorities, such 
as women, into the workforce by making provision for the Commission to monitor 155 
the workplace in ensuring employers make the necessary structural modifications to 
allow occupational desegregation. 
Monitoring is useful in both measurmg and remedying discriminatory practices 
because statistical collection and analysis does not seem to be sufficient 156 to 
convince employers to change their existing workplace structures. Although equal 
opportunity programmes serve a purpose in ensuring employers are familiar with 
specific provisions in the legislation, monitoring allows all parties to assess the 
reasonableness and effects of characteristics used by employers in reaching 
decisions. 157 This should avoid indirect discrimination occurring through ignorance 
at least. 
A monitoring role will also require a reappraisal of social attitudes. It may mean 
some employers have to implement positive discrimination programmes to achieve 
certain goals to reduce the effects of both past discrimination and current practices. It 
will involve a sharing of expectations and a recognition of family responsibilities and 
other commitments in the private sphere of all workers' lives. Only strategic 
planning will dismantle the gendered structure of the workplace and remove the 
present impediments to the best opportunities for all. It is the beginning step to 
structural change which should lead to an acknowledgment of the more widespread 
nature of the gendered structure of our current society. 
155 Section 13 of the Privacy Act 1993 permits the Commissioner to both audit and monitor 
agencies to ensure compliance with the Act. It is submitted a similar provision in the Human 
Rights Act 1993 is necessary if the legislation is to be realistically effective. 
156 Above n4, 127. 
157 Above n4, 128. 
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